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Introduction

The post world War II era saw the development, expansion, and implementation
of new international human rights law and protections in response to the terrible atrocities
that took place during the second world war. The United Nations, non-governmental
organizations, and activists witnessed the massive violations of human rights that had
occurred in the Second World War, and developed institutions and legal precedents under
such documents as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) to ensure that they never happened
again. One of the problems that these human rights advocates had to address was how to
punish gross violators of these new codes of international law. Undoubtedly, this was no
trivial or easy task, as prosecution required the violation of the principles of state
sovereignty that form the basis of international law, and that had been well entrenched for
hundreds of years dating back to the Treaty of Westphalia.
Nevertheless, if the provisions in the UDHR, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR that
advocates had worked tirelessly for were to be treated seriously, they had to be
enforceable, and violators had to be held accountable. The first system developed to
achieve this goal was the Nuremberg system, first implemented after World War to
address the horrific violations of the Holocaust, and other Nazi violations of human
rights. However, at this time (1946), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR), and other codifications of international human rights did not yet exist and the
Nuremberg trials played a large part in developing these protections, as well as
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developing a system for how violators would be charged. This system was based
primarily on retributive justice, and served to punish the abusers of basic human rights
with imprisonment or death. It was implemented as a direct result of the terrible
atrocities of World War II, most notably the Holocaust. The Nuremberg Tribunals gave
the world the term “crimes against humanity,” and set a new standard for international
prosecutions of state officials. Long after Human Rights had been implemented and
accepted through the United Nations and various treaties however, a second model of
justice arose. In the early 1990s, as the Apartheid regime finally crumbled, South Africa
focused more on creating a unified country out of the legacy that centuries of white
domination over blacks had formed and implemented Truth and Reconciliation
Commissions based primarily on restorative justice.
These two systems clearly arose, not only at different times but also out of
distinctive circumstances, to meet diverse goals, and respond to unique situations and
violations of fundamental human rights. Both also used different methods of
examination and punishment to achieve justice. However, both also have similarities
with one another that go well beyond the connection that both were implemented to
address violations of human rights. This essay will define these models, demonstrate
why they were used in different historical situations, evaluate their effectiveness at
achieving justice for those whose rights were violated, and finally raise considerations for
these systems’ possible future use in addressing human rights violations.
Furthermore, this essay will argue that the different strengths and weaknesses of
each model make each one uniquely adapted to dealing with particular situational
contexts, which is why most examples of transitional justice have focused largely on one
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model or the other. At the same time, a fundamental understanding that this essay
advances is that, contrary to the beliefs of many, there is in fact much to be gained from
combining the Nuremberg and South African models in a more even-handed approach to
justice. The only challenge that has to be overcome to achieve this is to understand the
contextual and situational factors that contribute to the selection of one model over the
other, and a willingness on the part of those designing and implementing the system to
incorporate aspects of both models into their transitional system of justice.

Historiography

The first wave of historians to write about the Holocaust and the Nazi regime
beginning in the 1950s, interpreted the events as the actions of a small, elite group within
the Nazi hierarchy whose fervent anti-Semitism led them to seek the elimination of
European Jewry. The literature, including works such as William L. Shirer’s The Rise
and Fall of the Third Reich, focused almost exclusively on this small group. Men like
Heinrich Himmler, Hermann Goring, and above all Adolf Hitler were seen as the
perpetrators of the heinous acts that so shocked the international community. In many
ways, the academic writing of this time period coincided perfectly with the popular
perceptions of Germans as well as the international community, whose understanding of
the Holocaust was likewise that a very small group, distinct from the normal German
population, had perpetrated it. The Nuremberg Trials, as some have noted, played no
small role in developing this belief as prosecutors concentrated their efforts exclusively
on the top tier or most heinous of Nazi officials. Whatever the underlying cause, it is
clear that this enormously influential first generation of Holocaust literature focused
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almost exclusively on the very few individuals who had played leadership roles within
the third Reich, and categorically ignored and dismissed the involvement of lower level
perpetrators.
However, beginning in the early 1960s new understandings of the Holocaust and
those involved in perpetrating it began to emerge. Hannah Arendt, writing about one of
the most significant post-Nuremberg Nazi trials in Eichmann in Jerusalem focused not
only on a slightly lower level Nazi, but also gave a different understanding of those
involved in the Holocaust altogether. Rather than racial hatred being a primary
motivator, Eichmann is portrayed as merely following orders. Eichmann was assigned a
task to do, and he completed that task. This new understanding of the Holocaust greatly
reinforced the previously held notion that thousands of middle and lower rank
perpetrators were merely following the orders of their superiors in a society dominated by
the necessity of order.
While this approach provided new insights into the Holocaust, it did not
necessarily refute the notion established at the end of World War II that the Holocaust
had been conducted by a small, elite group of top Nazi officials who were motivated
primarily by a deep hatred of the Jews. Other theories were also put forward during this
wave in the 1960s. The far left for example argued that capitalism was at least partially
to blame for the atrocities. According to these scholars, greed inspired by the evils of
modern capitalism led the Nazis to not only pursue the Second World War, but to attempt
to systematically exterminate entire populations, including European Jews, largely for
economic gain. Despite the presence of these ideas, the most significant implication of
this second wave was that for the first time, historians began to look beyond the few
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dozen Nazi leaders to mid and lower level and perpetrators. For now however, they still
believed that these men were following orders and had little, if any, choice in conducting
the heinous acts that they were assigned.
These perceptions lasted largely unchallenged by mainstream academia until the
early 1990s, when two groundbreaking works were published that in many ways
challenged a half-century of historical writing, and immediately reinvigorated an intense
debate about the Holocaust and, in particular, those involved in perpetrating it. The first
of these works, released in 1992 was Christopher R. Browning’s Ordinary Men: Reserve
Police Battalion 101 And The Final Solution In Poland. This book was based on a series
of interviews of a unit of the German Order Police, who during World War II were
assigned the task of systematically exterminating tens of thousands of Jews from
conquered Polish territory. This was one of the first works to focus exclusively on lower
level perpetrators– those who had actually carried out the executions of thousands. From
the very title of this work, Browning sought to dismiss the idea that these men were
merely following orders or that they were somehow psychopaths motivated by racial
hatred, and put forward the argument that these ordinary Germans were perpetrators just
as those many ranks above them had been. In a similar argument in 1996, Daniel
Goldhagen’s Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust also
refuted previously held notions that only the top-tier of Nazis, and not everyday
Germans, were responsible for, or even participated in the Holocaust.
Together, these two works greatly changed understandings of the Holocaust and
responsibility for its crimes. Today, it is understood that thousands more people, for a
wide variety of reasons, including economic or career goals, willingly participated on one
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level or another in the Holocaust. Nevertheless, these new understandings, that
economists, people with PhDs and everyday Germans participated in the Holocaust have
not answered everything. How harsh should history be on people who were starving and
did nothing to save their Jewish neighbors so that they could get more food? How hard
should it judge the men in Reserve Police Battalion 101, who were offered the chance to
not participate, but did so in order to not be judged negatively by their colleagues? These
are just some of the many new questions that this more complicated (though more
complete) understanding of the Holocaust has led to.
There is also a final division, not in historical development, but in academic
divisions that needs to be recognized in regard specifically to the Nuremberg Tribunal.
Legal scholars, concerned about the Trials shortcomings in relation to numerous accepted
legal principles have generally been more forward in criticizing the Trials for their
numerous legal shortcomings, including the lack of any sort of appeal, the loose legal
grounding of some of the charges, and a host of other issues related to widely accepted
principles and practices of jurisprudence. While historians recognize the faults inherent
in the system, they have been less committed to these judicial standards, and more apt to
ask, “If not Nuremberg, then what else?” Many historians have concluded that
Nuremberg, despite its faults, was a marvel given the war-torn context that it was
conducted in, and argued that the only legitimate alternatives at the time would have been
to simply execute, or release the Nazi leadership.
The history of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)
meanwhile has undergone far less historical development than Nuremberg, primarily
because the Commission finished its work so recently (at least in historical terms).
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Nevertheless, the South African TRC has been one of the most written on subjects in
transitional justice, beginning even while it was still going on. Some of the most
beneficial sources are the primary histories written by members of the Commission and
those involved in the proceedings. These include Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s No
Future Without Forgiveness and Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela’s A Human Being Died That
Night, which provide insight into the minds of those on the TRC itself, and their
perspectives.
However, the richest primary source above all else has to be the Final Report of
the TRC itself. The Report is a set of volumes that comprises the most comprehensive
set of testimony, summary, and understanding of the heinous acts people suffered during
the conflict over Apartheid. It includes not only geographic locations, but also the names
of thousands of individuals and how they suffered in this conflict. The Final Report
alone provides incredible insight into what and how people suffered, as well as how the
TRC sought to overcome what often amounted to intense hatred between different groups
of people. An additional source of information comes from research data, interviewing
South Africans about their thoughts on the Commission, which has provided eye-opening
insight in terms of understanding how effective the TRC was at its mission or
reconciliation. A final important collection of primary source material comes from the
media. The TRC, while it was operating hearing testimony, and reviewing amnesty
applications, was constantly written about not just by the South African press, but also by
the international media. As a result, a wealth of information is available through
newspaper articles, video documentaries, and other media outlets that chronicle the TRC,
particularly in relation to some of the most high profile hearings. Overall, the TRC has
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produced a wealth of primary source material that has helped scholars understand and
analyze the massive undertaking that constituted the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission.
While a host of secondary literature exists in a number of important fields
(including history, legal, transitional justice, etc.), much of the history, and in particular
our understanding of the TRC’s legacy have yet to be fully understood as only fifteen
years on from the close of the Hearings, historians continue to understand the long-term
implications, successes, and failures of the Commission. Nevertheless, a wealth of
information, including a host of scholarly writings in the legal and transitional justice
fields are available for academia to begin to understand, if not the TRC’s legacy, then at
least its grounding.
Works such as Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Did The TRC Deliver?
have begun to answer tough questions about how beneficial the TRC was at reconciling
South Africans. Likewise, dozens of publications have appeared in legal journals, and
the fields of literature in connection with alternative models of justice, as well as with
transitional justice are particularly well developed, with many scholars commenting on
the successes and shortcomings of the tribunals. Additionally, scholars have also taken
primary research data (which interviewed South Africans) in an attempt to understand to
what extent actual reconciliation between opposing groups occurred. Like the primary
source material, there is also a wealth of secondary information about the TRC.
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Methodology

As described in the previous section, a wealth of primary source material, in
relation to both the Nuremberg Trials and the South African TRC exists. In the case of
the Nuremberg Trials, documents entered as evidence, as well as notes belonging to
prosecutors and defense attorneys are just a small part of the evidentiary body. In the
case of the South African TRC, evidence includes thousands of witness testimonies,
interviews, and even documentaries involving victims and perpetrators. In both cases,
the evidentiary body is rich in courtroom and hearing transcripts, as well as newspaper,
and other media publications about the undertakings. The body of primary material in
both the Nuremberg Trials and the South African TRC is immense, to say the least,
involving tens of thousands of pages of written documents, and additional sources
including recordings of the events. While this primary record is undoubtedly incredibly
rich and informative, even attempting to just break the surface of the material from either
of these proceedings is a daunting task.
Thankfully, both the Nuremberg Trial and the South African TRC are some of the
most studied and analyzed legal events of the past century, and thousands of scholars
have devoted an untold amount of time to sifting through mountains of documents in
order to reach their own conclusions. As a result of this wealth of secondary literature
and the dedication of so many experts to developing greater understandings of the
systems of justice, this essay will not seek to focus on primary material. Instead, it aims
to gain deeper understandings for comparative purposes, of the strengths, weaknesses,
successes, and failures of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT) and the
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TRC respectively, by examining the conclusions of many experts who have so tirelessly
and expertly examined primary sources in order to synthesize and begin to answer
questions of individual strengths and weaknesses.
While directly examining primary sources can also yield useful information in
regards to strengths and weaknesses, the secondary literature is so well developed that in
many cases, it is unnecessary. Furthermore, examining secondary sources provides
insight into controversies and understandings that have developed after the events
themselves, which are absent from the primary material. Therefore, in examining the
writings of historians and legal scholars, this essay seeks to gain a further understanding
of the intricacies of each model of justice (by using the IMT and TRC as case studies), to
develop understandings of why each system was used in the context that it was, and
finally, to contribute to the field of transitional justice, by offering considerations for
implementing future legal programs.

THE NUREMBERG MODEL OF RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

Introduction

As the Second World War came to an end, the Allied leadership turned their
attention to punishing the Nazi leadership for the bloodiest war in world history, and the
horrific crimes perpetrated under the Third Reich, including the treatment of prisoners of
war, and most notably, the Holocaust. After intense negotiations between the Allied
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powers, it was decided that an international tribunal comprised of the victorious powers
would try the remaining Nazi leadership. This decision led to the Nuremberg Trials, a
series of tribunals held by the victorious allied powers in Nuremberg, Germany, to hold
the highest ranking Nazis, and the criminals who perpetrated the atrocities of the Second
World War responsible to the international community for their actions. Supreme Court
Justice Robert Jackson (the chief American prosecutor) perhaps articulated the goals of
Nuremberg best in his opening statement, saying “The wrongs which we seek to
condemn and punish have been so calculated, so malignant, and so devastating, that
civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored, because it cannot survive their being
repeated.”1
The primary goal of the Nuremberg Trials was to bring those individuals in the
Nazi regime responsible for the terrible atrocities perpetrated during the Second World
War, including of course the Holocaust, (but also such violations as the murder of
escaped allied prisoners of war) to justice. The Trials charged the top tier of Nazi
leadership with crimes against humanity, war crimes, waging a war of aggression, and
crimes against peace. It is thus not surprising that the allied powers used a retributive
system of justice that eventually dealt out death sentences to 11 defendants and prison
sentences to 7 more.2 It is widely believed that retributive justice serves as more of a
deterrent to future violators than restorative justice, and given Justice Jackson’s opening
statement, it is clear that the goal of the Nuremberg prosecutors was to attempt deterrence
through severe punishment.

1
2

Robert Conot, Justice at Nuremberg, (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1983), 105.
Conot, Justice at Nuremberg, 498.
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Taking place in the aftermath of the war from 1945-1946, the series of trials
punished the Nazi leadership with lengthy prison sentences, and in many cases death, for
their part in the atrocities perpetrated by Nazi Germany. The Nuremberg Trials thus
represented the first, and foremost example of the retributive model of justice as applied
by the international community. Retributive justice, broadly defined, is a system of
justice that seeks to punish the offender with imprisonment or death after they have been
found guilty through a trial of violating human rights. The retributive system was the
accepted system of the majority of criminal justice systems on the national level, and had
been well developed and used, in different variations in many Western countries for
hundreds of years. However, “The International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg
represented the first time that senior political and military leaders were tried and
sentenced by an international tribunal for their part in the commission of crimes against
peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity.”3
Nuremberg was the world’s first trial that held national leaders to such a standard,
and of all its legacies surely one of the greatest, and most pronounced, is the idea that
there exists a class of crimes so heinous and despicable, that the veil of state sovereignty
can not, and will not shield perpetrators from prosecution. The significance of
Nuremberg as a groundbreaking tribunal was perhaps best stated by Paul Gordon Lauren,
when he said “Never before in history had a legal proceeding attempted to make
government leaders internationally responsible as individuals for crimes covering so
much time, so many nations, or so many people.”4

3

Madelaine Chiam, “Different Models of Tribunals” in Legacy of Nuremberg: Civilising
Influence or Institutional Vengeance? (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), 205.
4
Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights, (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2003), 202.
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The tribunal charged the leadership of the Nazi Regime with “Crime Against
Humanity.”5 This is incredibly significant, as “Crimes Against Humanity” would
become virtually the standard charge for gross violators of human rights, and would be
subsequently used as justification for intervention, extradition, and prosecution. The
profundity of this charge, and the dedication to aggressively pursuing violators of
fundamental human rights that accompanies it (even if these rights were not explicitly
protected under international law) cannot be understated. Nuremberg became the first
application of an effective international effort to use retributive justice to bring violators
of human rights to justice, and developed into a blueprint for addressing human rights
violations. Although the Cold War effectively blocked its immediate implementation, it
has since been used in such instances as the International Criminal Tribunal for
Yugoslavia ICTY, Rwanda ICTR, and in the International Criminal Court ICC. The
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg had nurtured a strong discourse of rights
and inspired a new category of legal infrastructure based on the retributive model, and
then held perpetrators accountable effectively for their actions.

Strengths of the Nuremberg Model of Retributive Justice

The retributive model of justice used at Nuremberg had a number of strengths.
First, the prosecution of leading Nazi officials clearly established blame for the atrocities
that occurred under their command, and in many cases by their own orders. Surviving
relatives (or even those who had their rights violated but had not been killed) could see
the faces of the men responsible, and saw them executed or sent to prison. Even more
5

Conot, Justice at Nuremberg, (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1983), 24.
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importantly, the world has been left with a clear picture of who was responsible for one
of the greatest crimes in history.6 As Robert Conot, one of the foremost scholars on the
history of the Nuremberg Trials noted, Nuremberg directly resulted in the passage of the
Genocide Convention and a inviolable ban that exists to this day on policies that the
Nazis employed.7 The value of clearly establishing responsibility for the atrocities of the
Second World War and The Holocaust are incredibly important for two reasons. The
first value of the justice was the closure that the final judgments gave to victims and their
relatives. Second, the Trials delegitimized the systems, practices, and violence employed
by the Nazis, a ramification that continues through today in the form of a sort of taboo on
many policies employed by the Third Reich.
In relation to this idea of clearly establishing guilt, the Tribunal also clearly
developed an extremely in-depth historical record of the events of the Holocaust, the
second major strength of the Tribunal. Susanne Karstedt a scholar of Post-War German
reconstruction, who has done in depth research into the Nuremberg Trials and their
implications for post-conflict reconstruction noted that “The IMT was indeed conducted
as a ‘monumental spectacle’ of truth and justice with the clear objective not only to bring
the perpetrators to justice but to educate the German public.”8 The prosecution, in their
primary effort to establish the guilt of the defendants, compiled a wealth of evidence that
the Holocaust was meticulously planned and executed by the Nazi leadership. The
thousands of documents that implicated the men on trial (and others) “would never have
occurred without the decision to go to trial, that was the driving force behind the
6

Susanne Karstedt, “The Nuremberg Tribunal and German Society: International Justice and
Local Judgment in Post-Conflict Reconstruction” in Legacy of Nuremberg: Civilising Influence
or Institutional Vengeance? (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), 22.
7
Conot, Justice at Nuremberg, (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1983), 520.
8
Susanne Karstedt, “The Nuremberg Tribunal and German Society” in Legacy of Nuremberg, 17.
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exhaustive search for evidence.”9 As Karstedt went on to say “The prosecutions had
revealed a truth that could never be denied again by the majority of the population . . . .”10
The significance of this wealth of documents was best summed up by H.R. Trevor-Roper,
who wrote in The Last Days of Hitler that
Had it not been for this exposure it would have been possible for a new German
movement in ten years’ time to maintain that the worst of Nazi crimes were Allied
propaganda easily invented in the hour of such total victory. That is now
impossible. The most damning documents− the minutes of Hitler’s meetings . . .
Eichmann’s account of Himmler’s dissatisfaction at a mere 6,000,000 executions .
. . these and many others have now been through the test of cross-examination;
their signatures and authenticity have been confirmed.11
One of the greatest strengths of the organization and scrutiny of the Nuremberg trials, and
of the requirements of a criminal proceeding which requires a high level of proof thus
was the establishment of a clear and undeniable historical record of evidence that indicted
the Nazi leadership in the Holocaust and other crimes.
Third, Nuremberg established a precedent for dealing with gross violations of
human rights, and sent a message to later generations that crimes against humanity would
not be tolerated by the international community. Nuremberg set a precedent that began to
end the principle of inviolable state sovereignty, as for the first time leaders of a country
were held accountable as criminals under an international system of justice that had the
authority to punish them severely for their crimes. In fact, Nuremberg created an entire
new set of crimes, such as crimes against humanity, that were considered so heinous that
state sovereignty is an insufficient shield for those who violate them. Kelly and
McCormack noted that “all three categories of international crime [crimes against
9

Norbert Ehrenfreund, The Nuremberg Legacy: how the Nazi war crimes trials changed the
course of history, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 36.
10
Chiam, “Different Models of Tribunals” in Legacy of Nuremberg, 33.
11
H.R. Trevor Roper, in The Nuremberg Legacy: how the Nazi war crimes trials changed the
course of history, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 36.
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humanity, crimes against peace, and war crimes] in the Nuremberg Charter have
subsequently become well and truly entrenched in the corpus of customary international
criminal law.”12 Therefore, the Nuremberg Trials created a new set of laws and legal
framework in which to punish the worst violators of human rights and fundamental
freedoms that could not be automatically blocked by the principles of state sovereignty.
This extension of retributive justice to the international sphere was one of the great
strengths, and enduring legacies of the International Military Tribunal.
Finally, and perhaps surprisingly, it seems that Nuremberg also fostered
reconciliation among Germans, a success not usually associated with retributive justice.
Reconciliation is usually regarded as a goal better achieved by restorative models of
justice (to be discussed later), however, some argue that retributive justice can also
contribute to this goal. Graham T. Blewitt, a international legal scholar even argues “that
victims and survivors of crimes against humanity, and similar violations of international
humanitarian law, are more likely to forgive and allow reconciliation to occur, without
recourse to acts of revenge, if [retributive] justice is achieved.”13 Karstedt concluded in
her analysis that post-war “Germany has achieved reconciliation with those peoples who
had been the victims of German aggressive warfare, war crimes and genocide. Since the
beginning of the 1950s successive German governments started a long and drawn-out
process to compensate the victims of genocide, war crimes and mass atrocities that is still

12

Michael J. Kelly and Timothy L.H. McCormack, “Contributions of the Nuremberg Trial to the
Subsequent Development of International Law” in Legacy of Nuremberg: Civilising Influence or
Institutional Vengeance? (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), 108.
13
Graham T. Blewitt, “The Importance of a Retributive Approach to Justice” in Legacy of
Nuremberg: Civilising Influence or Institutional Vengeance? (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 2008), 39.
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going on.”14 Thus, several scholars have found evidence that retributive justice can lead
to reconciliation among formerly opposed and oppressed groups, an unlikely, and
perhaps unexpected strength of the Tribunal. As a final note, compensation is a
fundamental part of any reconciliation, and is used in restorative models of justice as well
(to be discussed in depth later).

Weaknesses of The Nuremberg Model of Retributive Justice

The Tribunal was not without its numerous faults. While the strength of
individual criminal responsibility led to clear guilt, and an in depth historical record of
the violations and German reconciliation, as an international model of justice it ensured
that Nuremberg failed to bring individuals below the top tier or Nazi officials to any sort
of justice, and most were essentially pardoned for their actions, due to the inability of the
Allies or Germans to effectively prosecute them (as there were far too many people to
prosecute all of them in a courtroom). As John H. Ralston and Sarah Finnin, two
international legal scholars noted, “The combination of the international system’s
particular capacity limitations and its commitment to individual criminal responsibility –
which requires that the court or tribunal fix liability on key individuals for their deliberate
wrongdoing, rather than groups for their collective wrongdoing – means that international
prosecutors must, as a necessity, be highly selective in committing resources to
investigating and prosecuting particular cases. They must isolate a handful of individuals

14

Karstedt, “The Nuremberg Tribunal and German Society” in Legacy of Nuremberg, 13-14.
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considered most responsible for crimes committed by a multitude of persons.”15
Unfortunately, while individual responsibility was an asset to Nuremberg’s establishment
of clear responsibility and punishment of those responsible, it was also a drawback, as
tens of thousands of individuals, whose responsibility had ranged from tacit support to
full involvement, had to be virtually ignored by the Tribunal due to the logistical
restraints of criminal prosecution.
While further prosecutions followed, they continued to focus on either the top
echelon of Nazi officials, or the most heinous perpetrators, never reaching the average
German officer or soldier who may have committed a violation. Furthermore,
Nuremberg was challenged by the sheer scope of atrocities. Prosecutors simply had to
focus on only the most outrageous violations, there were so many that an uncountable
number of terrible violations to peoples rights never faced prosecution of any sort for
their actions.16 Even after the Trials, when the “goal of prosecuting millions of Nazis
was turned over to German officials,” the “task was so enormous that it simply collapsed
of its own weight. The German courts charged 3.5 million persons with being major
offenders, offenders, lesser offenders or followers, but only 9,600 ever spent any time in
custody. By 1949 all but 300 had been freed.”17
This problem has severe ramifications for the justice process. As Karstedt noted,
a major drawback of the Tribunals setup was that “Several characteristics of the

15

John H. Ralston and Sarah Finnin, “Investigating International Crimes: A Review of
International Law Enfrorcement Strategies: Expediency v Effectiveness” in Legacy of
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Nuremberg Trial made it easy for the Germans to perceive of themselves as victims.
First, only representatives from the highest echelons were on trial, thus leading the public
to put all the blame for the crimes on the elites.”18 Thus, the trial made it appear, to many
German people, that they were not responsible for the atrocities of the Holocaust, but
rather that the “final solution” was planned and implemented by the Nazi hierarchy
without the knowledge or support of the German people. While this interpretation of
events undoubtedly existed prior even to the Nuremberg Trials, by focusing on only the
highest ranking individuals, Nuremberg gave legitimacy to and reinforced this view of
history among the German public (complicating our view of the results of the Trials in
regards to their efforts of producing an accurate historical criminal record). While the
idea that the Holocaust was perpetrated solely by the Nazi hierarchy is true to some
extent, this portrayal ignores the complicity of hundreds of thousands of Germans, who
were not only aware of what was taking place, but were implicated, because without
them, such a vast extermination project could never have taken place.
For example, historian Christopher R. Browning in his book Ordinary Men
chronicles the story of a German reserve police battalion, a quasi military unit that was
responsible for executing, transporting, or guarding Jews as they were deported to
concentration and extermination camps. Browning states that “For a battalion of 500
men, the ultimate body count was at least 83,000 Jews.”19 At the same time, Browning
details how many of the men in the unit struggled with their assignments, avoiding their
duties whenever it was possible, and whenever they could do so without putting
themselves in danger. Browning’s account is evidence that there were tens of thousands
18
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of people who were directly involved in the Holocaust, and that it could not have been
carried out without them. At the same time, it is evidence that many of those involved
did not support what they were ordered to do, but faced serious repercussions if they
refused. Their involvement, and to what extent “ordinary men” should be held
accountable for their actions has remained an issue of contention, even through the
present, with no one quite sure how to prosecute them (or for that matter, if to prosecute
them at all). Nevertheless, none of these individuals ever faced any sort of prosecution
for their actions. Thus, thousands of people who were fundamental to the
implementation of the Holocaust were permitted to just walk away and continue their
lives since Nuremberg proved unable to bring them to justice under the retributive model.
These serious problems were not specific to the IMT, but are a significant
drawback to the retributive model overall. As Mark Aarons, an international legal
scholar writes in Justice Betrayed: Post-1945 Responses to Genocide,
Quite properly, the ICC will only concern itself with the senior criminals
responsible for major crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes. These
are defined by the Statute that established the Court in such a way as to ensure
that even middle-ranking criminals are unlikely to be brought before the Court, let
alone the thousands of rank-and-file mass killers without whom the crimes could
never have been carried out. This leaves the middle and lower levels free to live
their lives, either in the countries where they committed their crimes or, often, in
new countries to which they have emigrated, hidden among the refugees and
survivors of the crimes.20
The retributive model of justice, due to its commitment to individual criminal
responsibility, as well as the logistics of building a case, cannot bring to justice, and must
in fact ignore, thousands of individuals whose support was essential to the crimes
success, and concentrate only on those most responsible and in leadership roles. In this
20
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way, individual responsibility is a double-edged sword, as it provides victims with a clear
picture of who is responsible for their suffering and can bring them to justice, however it
can do practically nothing against many of those lower level perpetrators, who may be
equally responsible.
Yet another set of significant problems resulted from the setup of the trial, this
time in the form of a number of legal challenges. The International Military Tribunal
was, at least in comparative terms to other judicial systems a rather hastily assembled
tribunal that combined a number of different aspects of various legal systems into one
working judicial body. Added to this, was Nuremberg’s status as the first trial of its kind
anywhere in the world. With no precedent, the result was a number of serious problems
that challenged Nuremberg as a legitimate system of justice on the basis of some of the
most fundamental guarantees of all legal frameworks. For example, “A major criticism
of the trial was its failure to provide for the defendants’ right to appeal their convictions
to a higher court.”21 The right to appeal, a basic guarantee in judicial systems around the
world, was absent from the Nuremberg Trials; the judges’ decision would be final and
absolute.
Even more controversial, the drafters of the Nuremberg Charter largely invented
the crimes that they charged the defendants with. Crimes against humanity for example,
had little grounding in former judicial precedent as a legal standard. This led to the
serious charge that the defendants were being charged ex post facto by the Tribunal, a
serious violation of accepted legal practice. Kelly and McCormack noted that “The
drafters of the Nuremberg Charter attempted to blur the issue of criminal law being
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applied retroactively by including in the definition of crimes against humanity a
requirement that any such crimes be perpetrated “in the course of war.”22 Thus, the
drafters of the Charter recognized the legal issues raised by the ad hoc and unchartered
nature of the Tribunal, and sought to at least minimize these challenges. Nevertheless,
questions of the legal grounding of the Tribunal have remained to challenge Nuremberg’s
legacy as an effective and legal system of justice. However, the alternative to this hastily
assembled trial was no trial at all, and furthermore precedent must begin somewhere.
Thanks to Nuremberg, Tribunals since have not faced the same criticisms due to the
widespread acceptance of Nuremberg’s founding principles. Nevertheless, several key
issues with Nuremberg, most notable the lack of any sort of appeal remain uncorrected.
A final serious criticism of the Nuremberg Trials is the complete lack of
involvement of victims in the Trials. Karstedt stated that “there were no victims present,
not even representatives who could speak on their behalf . . . . Consequently, the
Nuremberg Trial was a trial that only gave voice to the perpetrators . . . .”23 In addition to
their absence, Ehrenfreund also noted a lack of emphasis on the victims, saying that “At
all the Nuremberg Trials, the court’s attention was focused on the defendants and their
punishment. No mention was made of help for the victims. No part of the sentencing
process attempted to alleviate the suffering of the millions ravaged by Nazi cruelty.”24
These silences, as well as decisions by the prosecution to pursue the charge of waging an
aggressive war as the chief charge above crimes against humanity have not only given
rise to challenges about Nuremberg’s value as a justice system that serves the victims of
atrocities, but has also furthered allegations that the Trials were more about punishment
22
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than justice.25 Therefore, the absence of victims from the trials was a negative aspect that
has led historians to challenge elements of the Tribunal ever since. Ehrenfreund wrote
that “Much would have been added to Nuremberg’s reputation for fairness and
compassion if it had initiated a reparations program at the beginning and created a
victims’ trust fund similar to the one established later by the International Criminal
Court.”26 Thus, despite this drawback, subsequent Tribunals have been careful to
incorporate victim’s into proceedings in an effort to address some of the shortcomings of
Nuremberg.

“Victor’s Justice” Strength or Weakness?

In addition to the problems of prosecution, which some have charged as being
highly subjective, Nuremberg also faced a number of other problems and accusations of
failure. Of all the numerous challenged raised against the Tribunal, the most serious and
most frequently raised objection, is what can best be categorized as the charge of
“victor’s justice.” Essentially, those that denounce the trial as “victor’s justice” note that
the defendants were tried before a bench comprised of representatives of the victorious
Allied Powers, that there were no such trials of the victorious allies, and that the Trial
was little more than a show, intent on condemning the Nazis from the outset, and was not
fair by even the most basic standards of judicial systems. As Norbert Ehrenfreund noted
in The Nuremberg Legacy: How the Nazi War Crimes Trials Changed the Course of
History, “Every judge on the Nuremberg bench represented a victorious Allied power.
25
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No neutral country was represented, nor was any request ever made for a judge from a
neutral power. No German judge sat on the bench, nor was such an arrangement ever
considered; there was no jury; neither the defendants nor their counsel had any say about
the trial procedure; it was not a trial by one’s peers. No Allies were on trial on chargers
of war crimes. Only the losers were tried.”27 Here, Ehrenfreund lays out the slew of
charges that those who support the idea of “victor’s justice” (meaning a show trial used to
discredit the Tribunal). These charges have remained serious challenges to the
Nuremberg legacy.
As Michael J. Kelly and Timothy L.H. McCormack noted, these allegations have
become extremely common, and have significant negative ramifications for how the trial
is viewed. They state that,
The persistent allegation of ‘victor’s justice’ is so entrenched that it has produced
a simplistic view that war crimes trials are only ever selectively imposed on the
losing side. It is true that both the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals were
established by the winning side in World War II and imposed on the vanquished.
There was never any suggestion that Allied nationals would be subject to the
same Tribunals, the same subject-matter jurisdiction, or the same procedure as
defeated German and Japanese defendants.28
One of the most significant criticisms of the Tribunal is the idea that Nuremberg was a
sort of “institutionalized vengeance,” rather than true justice, and thus was not about
achieving justice for victims, but was about blaming the Nazis for all the destruction that
had taken place. These allegations strike at the very heart of questions surrounding
justice by arguing that a trial imposed in such a manner cannot be fair by the most basic
accepted standards of justice, and have, even today, served to discredit the Nuremberg
trial as a travesty of justice.
27
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Despite the heavy criticism of the trials in this regard, a whole host of new
literature has come forward (much of it from a new school of legal scholars, but also
from several historians) arguing that the so called victor’s justice was not only fair and
achieved justice, but was actually beneficial to the judicial process. While Kelly and
McCormack summarized the criticism of victor’s justice, they also went on to denounce
many of its allegations, stating
’Victors justice’ is often used as a disparaging label to characterize a lack of
Allied willingness to hold their own nationals criminally accountable. That
characterization is fallacious. Allied nations did undertake disciplinary proceedings
against their own servicemen and women for alleged violations of the law of war. The
US, for example, tried hundreds of its own personnel, including for violations of the law
committed against the civilian populations of various areas they occupied. Many of those
US nationals convicted of violations were awarded severe sentences and a significant
number were sentenced to death and subsequently executed.”29
This viewpoint suggests that the Allies did hold a minimum standard of conduct for their
troops, while noting that Allied leadership was never expected to by tried by the same set
of standards Nazi officials were. However, it is essential to understand that while Allied
commanders may have targeted civilian centers in their bombing campaigns and caused
the deaths of millions of people themselves, the historical record does not even suggest
that the goal of Allied leaders was as heinous or diabolical as the extermination of entire
populations. Thus, perhaps it is fitting that Nazi leaders responsible for the “final
solution” were subject to a Tribunal such as Nuremberg, while their Allied counterparts
were not.
Furthermore, there are those who argue that victor’s justice (in reference to the
idea that the victorious powers executed the Trials) was a strength of the Tribunal, given
the state or post-war Germany. It is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine the Nazi
29
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leadership being tried by anything but the victorious powers, given the ravaged state of
war-torn Germany. What little was left of Germany’s leadership and justice system that
had remained after the war had been removed by denazification, and it is difficult to
come up with an alternative to the Tribunal that would have given the defendants as fair a
trail as they received. As Norbert Ehrenfreund stated, “Yes, [the Trial] was victors’
justice and the trial had its share of injustice. But the only alternative was no trial at all,
or either setting the Nazis free or executing them summarily without giving them a
chance to defend themselves.”30 In this regard, victor’s justice is a powerful strength, as
it allowed justice to be served in an era and place where it otherwise would likely have
been a travesty.
While international involvement and oversight allowed the Trials to take place in
as fair an atmosphere as possible, it also exposed the Trials, and the defendants, to
international politics and pressures. The Trials themselves were in many ways a
compromise between the Russians, who favored a harsher form of justice, and the other
Allies. As the Cold War began to dominate international politics, occupied Germany
became the center of contention, where East met West, and many of the early releases of
convicted Nazi officials in the 1950s were a result of this atmosphere. This was arguably
a downside of international involvement, as systems of justice face great difficulty in
fairly prosecuting individuals on the basis of evidence when they become too involved
with politics of any kind.
Despite this problem with Allied involvement, there is evidence that the German
people also felt that the victor’s justice brought down at Nuremberg was fair. In her
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analysis of polling and other public opinion work in post-war Germany in relation to the
Tribunal, Susanne Karstedt analyzed the question “Was the IMT Seen as Victor’s
Justice?,” and concluded that yes it was, but that “The German public obviously found
‘victors’ justice’ just and fair, and supported the way it was done as well as the final
outcome.”31 Nuremberg may have been a system arbitrarily imposed on the Nazi
leadership, but it was by far the closest to a real operating judicial system the Nazi
leadership were going to get at that time, and it seems that far from resenting it, the
German people looked upon the proceedings in a favorable light. Additionally, despite
the many criticisms and problems that faced the Tribunal, “the judgment of historians
from both sides was that the trial was basically fair.”32 While many have focused on the
shortcomings of the Tribunal, the general consensus is that while it was imperfect, it was
a fair trial.
Scholars made a number of arguments that both support and oppose the idea of
victor’s justice being employed at the Nuremberg Trials. In short, the trials were victor’s
justice in the sense that the Tribunal was set up, run, and ultimately decided by the
victorious Allied powers. The setup and function of the trial has been an issue of
contention ever since, as some regard it as a failure of justice due to the governing role of
the Allied powers, particularly on the bench. However, claims that “victor’s justice” was
a form of institutional vengeance that superseded true justice and was some sort of mock
trial whose decision was set from the beginning, as well as claims that the Allies
systematically ignored similar violations on their own side have little basis in historical
fact. Why, if the outcome was predetermined were defendants such as Hans Fritzsche,
31
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who was a key propaganda and media figure and Franz von Papen, the former German
Chancellor acquitted? Furthermore, “victor’s justice” undoubtedly had its advantages,
most notably its provision of a timely and effective judicial system in a ravaged country
that, in all likelihood, would not have been able to conduct such a comprehensive set of
trials on its own without such international oversight. Thus, victor’s justice is perhaps
best viewed as a double-edged sword, it had both its strengths and its weaknesses in
achieving justice.

Conclusion

The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was a groundbreaking
experiment that held criminals responsible to the international community for their
heinous crimes. The Trials significantly broke down the barrier of state sovereignty to
prosecuting national leaders for crimes committed under their watch. The Trials had a
number of strengths, which included clearly and swiftly bringing those responsible to
justice, as well as establishing an irrefutable historical record and wealth of
documentation of the Nazis atrocities. Finally, Nuremberg also fostered some basic
reconciliation among Germans and their victims by forcing Germans to acknowledge the
heinous crimes they had perpetrated. However, like any system of justice, Nuremberg
was imperfect and not without its flaws. The most serious of these were legal issues that
violated standards of law, and tarnished Nuremberg’s legacy, the complete absence of
victims’ from the trial, as well as an apparent lack of focus on the victims by the
prosecution, and finally, the problem that only the highest ranking and most heinous

Nuremberg or the South African TRC?

31

perpetrators could be tried. Finally, “Victor’s Justice” ensured the fairest possible trial
for the defendants, it also brought in allegations of “institutionalized vengeance.”
While later Tribunals have significantly improved the Nuremberg model of
retributive justice by including victims and not being subject to the same uncertain legal
grounding, the basic strengths and weaknesses of this model have remained largely
unchanged. It is also necessary to understand more than just the strengths and
weaknesses of this model, as the long-term effects that it has are also important. By
putting the leadership of the Nazi regime on trial, Nuremberg successfully put on trial (at
least in spirit) the entire Nazi regime, and effectively served to discredit it as a
government.33 As a result of the Nuremberg trials, and the truths uncovered during them,
Nazism as a legitimate system of government has been completely discredited, along
with policies that they employed in numerous fields of governance. While Nazis
continue to exist, they remain few in number and ostracized from mainstream society.
The implications of Nuremberg style retributive justice, while only actually trying a few
individuals, implicated an entire system of government, which remains discredited.
While the focus and intent of the Trials was to punish offenders following the
retributive model, it also engaged in amnesties and reparations, a provision usually
associated with the restorative model of justice. As Karstedt reflected, “It is an often
neglected and perhaps unduly censored fact that amnesties were an integral, though
unplanned part of the model, and quite sweeping amnesties already started during the
occupation.”34 Many saw this as betraying the very principles that had inspired the
Tribunal in the first place, and a travesty of justice. For example, Norbert Ehrenfreund
33
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stated that the early release of Alfred Krupp, one of the worst war criminals who used
forced labor to supply Hitler’s Third Reich with military arms as staining “Nuremberg’s
reputation as the great promise of justice.”35 Although Nuremberg promised to bring
those responsible for the atrocities of the Second World War to justice, gave amnesty to
many, and released many other criminals long before their sentences were complete.
This amnesty may have furthered reconciliation and forward progress, but to many, it
was a betrayal of the principles of Nuremberg and a travesty of justice.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Introduction

In sharp contrast with the Nuremberg Trials, the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission’s main goal was not to punish with imprisonment or death
the violators of human rights, and as a result the leaders of the new South Africa
employed a restorative, rather than retributive system of justice. Restorative justice,
loosely defined is a system of justice that seeks to return the situation to the way it was
before the violation occurred, using public hearings. As Elazar Barkan notes, restorative
justice “includes reparation, restitution of property, restitution of cultural property,
historical commissions and apologies as a form of atonement.”36 Perhaps the best
explanation of what the new South Africa and the Truth Commission were about came
from Nelson Mandela, who as President heavily influenced both. In his autobiography
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Mandela states “From the moment the results were in and it was apparent that the ANC
was to form the government, I saw my mission as one of reaching reconciliation, of
binding the wounds of the country, of engendering trust and confidence . . . I said all
South Africans must now unite and join hands and say we are one country, one nation,
one people, marching together into the future.”37 Evidence of similar ideology is evident
in The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, which states “Every person shall
have the right to equality before the law and to equal protection of the law” among
numerous other rights that attempt to directly counter the law of Apartheid South Africa,
by including every South African as an equal member in a new society.3839
The most important goal for South Africa was to form a unified country out of
two groups of people that were, to say the least, distrustful of each other.40 Any attempt
to severely punish perpetrators of the terrible atrocities that had plagued the nation for the
past half century would likely have been counterproductive to this primary goal of
reconciliation, and would have served only to encourage the negative feelings that black
and white South Africans had toward each other (even though South Africa cannot be
considered a clear-cut post-war scenario with clear winners and losers). The Truth
Commission, could, and did establish blame for the events that had occurred, however
saying that the Apartheid government was solely responsible for all of the atrocities
would likely only have served to vindicate victims and relatives, and reinforce the view
among many of white South Africans as oppressors, making reconciliation less likely. It
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may be that the system of Apartheid in South Africa instigated the violence, but it is
equally clear that both sides used violence, which often harmed innocent people.41 While
it is impossible to say with certainty what would have happened, it is clear that the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) recognized that at certain times, both the
government and ANC (through Spear of the Nation) had been at fault, likely because of
fears that merely placing all of the blame on one actor would be counterproductive to
reconciliation.42
Truth Commissions did not originate in South Africa, and had their origins in the
1980s in various countries transitioning from authoritarian style regimes to more open
societies, with famous examples in South America including systems in Chile and
Argentina. While Truth Commissions had been used numerous times prior to South
Africa, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission has become the worlds
foremost example of restorative justice, and is arguably the best developed example of
the model. South Africa has also had the benefit of being by far the most high profile set
of hearings, and has accordingly received enormous attention from scholars. Just as the
Nuremberg model, the South African model is imperfect, and not without its faults, but
likewise, it too had a number of strengths that made it an example worthy of further study
as a post-conflict system of justice.
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Strengths of the South African TRC

The first, and arguably greatest strength, of the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission was its emphasis, focus, and detail on victims, their relatives,
and victim’s rights. Justice, in relation to any crime so horrible as those that occurred in
South Africa, must as an absolute necessity focus on those who suffered the worst
violations of fundamental human rights. In this respect, the TRC did an outstanding job,
as it allowed everyday people to come forward and tell their stories. While it is true that
many of the hearings, particularly the most well covered hearings, had to do with people
in leadership positions, or involved with particularly heinous or well-known crimes, the
vast majority of those that the TRC heard from were everyday people that had been
caught up in the violence endemic in Apartheid South Africa.
For example, a review of the TRC Final Report lists tens of thousands of
everyday people, and chronicles their suffering. “Mr. Makulana Phato [EC1819/97ETK]
was held for five years, variously at Bizana, Mount Frere, Umtata and Butterworth. His
family told the Commission they did not know whether or not he had stood trial. He was
assaulted in custody, released, and died of head injuries a few months later.”43 The
Volumes of the TRC’s Final Report are filled with such chronicles of people who
suffered torture, banishment, and even death in the conflict that tore through South
Africa, and thus, a great strength of the TRC was its ability to involve, and even focus on
everyday people and allow them to tell their stories.
Even more importantly for the victims, it became apparent that the commission
served those who had suffered in ways beyond just reparations. Archbishop Desmond
43

“Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report,” Volume 3, 44.

Nuremberg or the South African TRC?

36

Tutu, one of the architects of the TRC, its leader, and a strong advocate of the restorative
model stated in his book No Future Without Forgiveness, that “We found that many who
came to the commission attested afterward to the fact that they had found relief, and
experienced healing, just through the process of telling their story.”44 Scholars of
transitional justice have also reached a similar conclusion, as Amy Gutmann and Dennis
Thompson in “The Moral Foundations of Truth Commissions” said “Another common
defense of truth commissions adopts the perspective of the victims. Some proponents of
this defense follow a therapeutic approach, pointing to the psychological benefits of
offering public testimony and receiving public confirmation of injustice.”45 For this
reason, as well as the Commission’s focus on everyday people, one of the greatest
strengths has to be the relief it brought to those people and relatives who were involved in
the TRC hearings.
A final consideration of the benefits to victims were the sheer number of people,
in many cases ordinary people, who were involved in TRC hearings or the reconciliation
process in some other way, such as amnesty applications. Despite initial estimates that
around 200 amnesty applications would be received, the TRC ultimately had more than
7,000 people apply for amnesty.46 In addition to this, thousands of people came before
the TRC in its hearings to give testimony, hundreds of people found out new information
about the suffering and disappearances of their loved ones, and dozens of families were
able to give the remains of their loved ones proper burials. It is difficult, if not
44
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impossible to imagine that any other model of justice could directly involve so many
victims and perpetrators. By contrast, “two large, high-profile postapartheid trials
yielded only one conviction.”47 The ability to touch the lives of thousands of people all
across South Africa was undoubtedly a powerful strength of the TRC’s model of
restorative justice.
A second major strength of the TRC was the establishment of an extremely in
depth and detailed account of the conflict that raged in South Africa for four decades, and
developed a historical record for future generations (much like Nuremberg did a halfcentury earlier). The Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s Final Report is just one of
many chronicles that now exist and seek to examine and understand what really happened
in South Africa from 1960 (and before) through 1994. Archbishop Tutu detailed the
bombing of Khotso House, the “headquarters of the South African Council of Churches;”
at the time, the bombing was blamed on the ANC. An amnesty application to the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission ultimately exposed the truth, that the Apartheid
government had secretly been responsible for the crime. Archbishop Tutu stated that
“The world and South Africa would perhaps never have been the wiser about what
actually happened to Khotso House had it not been for the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission.”48
Tutu was furthermore quoted by Antjie Krog as saying “I am thrilled by the new
information that has come out in amnesty applications about the Pebco Three and
Cradock Four- and especially Steve Biko. We’ve never got this information before and
the country deserves to have it. This uncovering more or less justifies the existence of
47
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the commission.”49 The hope of amnesty, and the threat that someone would find out
about past crimes after the TRC had completed its work, when such forgiveness was no
longer available, convinced many to come forward with new information that might
otherwise never have been found, and ask forgiveness. These situations are an example
of how the TRC was able to reveal many truths amid the mystery of many disappearances
and events in Apartheid South Africa, and thus contributed greatly to the establishment of
an accurate historical record.
A related strength of the TRC was its ability to not only establish a more accurate
representation of what had happened in South Africa, but also to revise the way that
many people viewed the atrocities committed under Apartheid. Archbishop Tutu,
speaking again about the Khotso House bombing once again, said “Most of the white
community, having been brainwashed by propaganda spewed forth by the governmentcontrolled electronic media, swallowed [the government’s account of an ANC bombing]
hook, line, and sinker. They simply added it to their tally of dastardly deeds of terrorism
carried out by those savages who wanted to overthrow a Christian, God-fearing
government….”50 Prior to the TRC, the majority of white South Africans focused on the
violations committed by the ANC in their bombing campaigns, while Africans had
focused on the atrocities committed by the Apartheid government. The TRC, by calling
before it for testimony violators from both sides made it more strikingly clear that both
sides had committed gross violations, and in doing so arguably furthered its goal of
reconciliation by forcing people to realize the horrible pain and suffering that had been
caused by both sides.
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Weaknesses of the South African TRC

Despite the numerous strengths the TRC exhibited, it was not without its faults,
and struggled in several aspects of its mission, as well as received major criticism.
Without any doubt, the largest criticism of the TRC was the amnesty process, which
resulted in perpetrators of severe crimes being allowed to walk free, while their victims
and their families would never be the same. Elizabeth Kiss wrote that, “If truth
commissions have a moral Achilles’ hell, it is the issue of amnesty.”51 As the newspaper
The Sowetan wrote “‘Reconciliation that is not based on justice can never work’” and it
was noted by Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson that “The paper was expressing not
only a widely shared doubt about this particular commission, but also the most commonly
voiced objection to truth commissions in general.”52 Gutmann and Thompson went on to
voice the largest criticism of the TRC, that it was not a legitimate form of justice at all.
They stated “Justice is not achieved when a murderer or rapist publicly acknowledges his
crimes but is not brought to trial and suffers no further punishment.”53 These charges
strike at the very heart of the TRC’s mission, setup, and conduct, and threaten it as a
system of justice in itself.
However, while the focus of the TRC was on amnesty, and many people
previously convicted, or who had come forward with applications confessing their crimes
were granted amnesty, some were not. Blanket amnesty was rejected by the ANC and
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TRC, and many who were not awarded amnesty faced prison time, and a more punishing
model of justice that would usually be associated with the retributive model. Perhaps the
best example of such punishment is the case of Eugene de Kock. De Kock, dubbed
“Prime Evil” by the South African and international media, was a commander in the
South African Police, attached to a special unit whose mission it was to seek out and
destroy anti-Apartheid forces. De Kock committed some of the most heinous crimes
carried out by the Apartheid government directly, and through the men under his direct
command. For his involvement in these crimes de Kock was awarded 212 years in prison
after being convicted in a criminal court on 89 charges, including multiple murder
charges.54 De Kock was not awarded amnesty, and remains in prison for his crimes.55
De Kock is an example that despite the focus on forgiveness, amnesty, and reconciliation,
justice in post-Apartheid South Africa was not without a more retributive side.
There were also a number of difficulties that plagued the TRC that went beyond
criticism of the amnesty policy. The first of these problems had to do with the difficulty
the Commission faced in uncovering documents, evidence, and witness testimony from
events which dated back nearly forty years. Furthermore, the lengths that the ANC, and
especially the Apartheid government had gone to ensure absolute secrecy about their
actions compounded this difficulty. Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela noted that “investigators
in the post-apartheid era discovered, to their dismay, that the government’s trail of blood
ended right where the atrocities had been committed. It did not lead to the corridors of
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power.”56 Eugene de Kock, for example, implicated his superiors numerous times during
TRC hearings, and afterward, and although many people applied for amnesty as a result
of his statements, many of the highest ranking individuals in the Apartheid regime, whose
policies had directly led to these atrocities, and who may have approved them, were not
brought to justice in any form, restorative or otherwise.
Nothing highlights this problem better than the case of P.W. Botha, the former
President of South Africa, who presided during some of the darkest, and most violent
days of Apartheid in the 1980s. Botha repeatedly ignored subpoenas from the TRC, and
the TRC eventually had to bring him to court on criminal charges of ignoring the TRC’s
summons. When he finally had to appear in a court of law, Antjie Krog wrote “We don’t
expect him to tell the truth”.57 While the TRC had finally forced Botha into a court of
law to ask him questions, they could not force him to apply for amnesty, nor could they
uncover any documents or evidence that made him complicit in the terrible crimes
perpetrated by his government. Despite the best intentions and efforts on behalf of the
TRC, the Apartheid regime had been incredibly effective in its secrecy, and left little
evidence of its many crimes. As a result of this, “the TRC’s encounters with the highestranking leaders of apartheid, former prime ministers/presidents Pieter W. Botha and
Frederik W. de Klerk, were frustratingly inconclusive.”58 The absence of evidence
implicating many Apartheid leaders, not only gave them an incentive to not apply for
amnesty, but also allowed them to completely escape from any system of justice,
restorative or retributive.
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Unfortunately, this problem, extends beyond the ANC leadership. While it was
previously noted that a strength of the model was its ability to include thousands of
people, they were still only a minute fraction of the overall population. Major sections of
South African society, most notably, white South African society, were not drawn into
the TRC, even as spectators. Archbishop Tutu stated “For me, one of the greatest
weaknesses in the commission was the fact that we failed to attract the bulk of the white
community to participate enthusiastically in the process.”59 When so many white South
Africans failed categorically to participate, or even give credence to the TRC in some
cases, the result was an undermining of the Commission and its mission of fostering
reconciliation.
Another problem that plagued the TRC was the problems of reparations that were
promised, but were plagued by delays in their delivery. While at first this may seem like
a minor problem, it was potentially very damaging in its consequences, as it threatened to
take away legitimacy of the TRC system, by allowing perpetrators to walk away, while
victims got nothing. As Antjie Krog stated, “The Reparation and Rehabilitation
Committee could make or break the Truth Commission. It will help little if the
transgressors walk away with amnesty, but the victims, who bear the appalling costs of
human rights abuses, experience no restitution. No gesture of recognition or
compensation.”6061 Immediately, reparations became a problem. Who qualified as
victims, relatives of victims, how distant? How much should compensation be? How
much could the government afford?
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To make matters worse, a firestorm of misinformation about reparations occurred
in the media. In its final media conference, Commissioners state, “’We have failed the
victims’… ‘Our biggest regret is that we failed the victims-here we are, three years down
the line, and the victims still don’t have anything.’ They recommend that future
commissions ensure that they have the powers and the means to implement some form of
reparation swiftly and without government involvement or possible sanction to impede
the process.”62 Reparations were an incredibly problematic issue for the Commission,
and the drawn out process involved after their promise was a disservice to victims, and
undermined the effectiveness of the TRC.
Another, extremely serious problem, was that the TRC was the product of, and
subject to the political atmosphere in South Africa. However, this aspect of the TRC was
not all bad, as Robert J. Rotberg noted in “Truth Commissions and the Provision of
Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation” stated that “The TRC grew out of an elaborate
political compromise that rejected the outgoing regime’s demand for blanket amnesty and
no retribution in exchange for a mechanism (the TRC) that could grant amnesty for
political acts.”63 The transfer of power between the Apartheid government and the new
ANC government led to a compromise that was agreeable to both sides, and allowed the
TRC to complete its important work, while at the same time refusing to simply let all
perpetrators go free.
However, as the Commissions work progressed, it became apparent quickly that
there would be a political clash between the current ANC government and the TRC over
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the investigations into ANC sponsored violations. There is no question that there were
those who suffered horrendously at the hands of the ANC in their attempt to destroy
Apartheid. As Archbishop Tutu stated “In the 1980s the ANC embarked on a bombing
campaign against targets it claimed were connected to security force personnel, targets
such as police stations or military installations. Contrary to the ANC’s declared
intentions, however, most of those who were killed in such explosions were in fact
civilians and not security force personnel.”64 The ANC had clearly been responsible for
violations in its battle against Apartheid, and in order to ensure that justice was fair, and
to protect the legitimacy of the TRC as being fair, Archbishop Tutu and his Commission
had to hear from people who had suffered at the hands of the ANC, as well as seek the
truth from the ANC leadership.
This necessity on the part of the TRC unfortunately led to conflict between the
Commission and the South African government. While the ANC endorsed the TRC, and
showed its support by, among other things, filing many amnesty applications themselves
and giving testimony to the Commission, the ANC became increasingly concerned, and
arguably even opposed to the TRC’s conclusions on ANC induced atrocities. In fact, the
ANC tried to block TRC’s release of its final report over concerns about “the findings on
the ANC.”65 Despite the best intentions of the ANC, and its commitment and support of
the TRC, the Commission was undoubtedly a product of politics in South Africa, and
despite its relative independence, it was nevertheless subject to political pressures within
South Africa. For example, the official platform of the ANC, put forward by Thabo
Mbeki, was that “whatever went wrong was in the context of a just war against a racist
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dispensation and should be treated as such. On the basis of the Geneva conventions and
protocols, the ANC rejected the finding of the TRC that it was guilty of gross violations
of human rights.”66
Furthermore, it was made known during the Commission’s hearings that, due to
the attempts by the ANC to form a working alliance with the Inkatha Freedom Party
(IFP) that “criticism by the TRC” of the IFP was “unwelcome”.67 It is hard to judge how
much actual effect this knowledge had on the TRC, however, it is clear that the more
involved in politics a system of justice is, the more vulnerable it is to outside influence
that threatens the fairness of the judicial process. The TRC, unfortunately, despite its
independence, was tied into politics with its involvement in questioning political parties
(although it is impossible to completely remove politics from any system of justice).
Another criticism of the TRC was the time constraints on amnesty applications.
The TRC, under its mandate, was charged with examining allegations of violations that
had occurred between 1960 and 1994. While these dates were not arbitrary, but
coincided with the Sharpeville Massacre and the end of Apartheid rule, respectively, they
had the effect of excluding many serious violations from the Commissions mandate.
Apartheid had been the official policy of South Africa since the National Party took
office in 1948, Africans had suffered tremendously long before that, with such events as
the Native Land Act of 1913 having huge negative repercussions for Africans. Did the
Africans who suffered under these time periods, not count, did they not suffer equally as
those who were falsely imprisoned after 1960? While it was necessary to set some date
for the Commission’s starting point (as it was unrealistic for the Commission to examine
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violations dating back to 1652, or even the 19th Century for that matter), it was
nevertheless a weakness of the model of justice that dates simply excluded some people
from the TRC, and thus also excluded from any positive healing, reconciliation or truths
that were found during the process.

Did the TRC Deliver On Its Promise of Reconciliation?

One of the most fundamental questions that has been hotly debated about the
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission is, whether the TRC delivered on its
promise of reconciliation between Africans and Afrikaners. This question is essential
because one of the primary justifications for granting gross violators of human rights
amnesty was that it was more important to foster reconciliation and healing among two
distinct groups that had to live together and function effectively in a single nation. If the
TRC did not achieve reconciliation, then this moral justification nullifies the model. The
answer to this question, as Antjie Krog wrote, “is both simple and complex.”68 The
records of TRC hearings, as well as numerous secondary writings and documentaries
attest to reconciliation as subjective. In essence, this means that the TRC found that there
were many people ready and willing to find closure, acceptance, and move forward,
while many more simply could not bring themselves to forgive, or reconcile with those
who had been responsible for terrible atrocities.
There were many people involved with the TRC hearings and procedures who
were willing, and in fact wanted to sit down with the people who had taken their loved
ones from them. Archbishop Tutu wrote of people’s “unprecedented magnanimity in
68
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their willingness to forgive those who had tormented them so,” and even quoted a victim
as saying “’We do want to forgive but we don’t know whom to forgive.”’69 Pumla
Gobodo-Madikizela likewise chronicled an amazing story of forgiveness and
reconciliation between Eugene De Kock and the widow of a man he had killed, Mrs.
Faku, who said “’I could hear him, but was overwhelmed by emotion, and I was just
nodding, as a way of saying yes, I forgive you. I hope that when he sees our tears he
knows that they are not only tears for our husbands, but tears for him as well…. I would
like to hold him by the hand, and show him that there is a future, and that he can still
change.’”70 Likewise, the documentary about the TRC, Long Night’s Journey Into Day
found evidence that forgiveness and reconciliation was possible and could be advanced
by TRC hearings, amnesty applications, and the truth. The parents of Amy Biehl for
example did not oppose amnesty for their daughter’s murderers, and even met with their
mother in a gesture of forgiveness and reconciliation.71 There is no doubt that for many
individuals caught up in the violence of Apartheid South Africa, the TRC fulfilled its
promise to break down the hate, mistrust, and misinformation that had divided white and
black South Africans.
However, for many other people, the TRC was a much more frustrating exercise,
as they failed to forgive those who had torn their lives apart, and reconciliation failed.
Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela said simply that “Not all the victims who appeared before
South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission were willing or able to forgive
those who had so deeply violated their integrity.”72 Gobodo-Madikizela recalled the
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story of a Mrs. Plaatjie whose son was killed by the police, and said that “’The TRC is a
pointless exercise,’ she said. She had forgotten her pain, she told me, and had ‘put grass
over the past,’…. ‘And now you want me to remember? Is this going to bring back my
son?’73 As further evidence, the documentary Long Night’s Journey Into Day cites the
widow of one of the Cradock 4 as saying that she cannot forgive the men who lit her
husband’s remains on fire, and opposed amnesty for her husband’s murderer.74 There is
no doubt that the acts committed in the battle to preserve, and destroy Apartheid, were for
many relatives and victims, so heinous, that they could never forgive what had happened.
The effectiveness of the TRC at fostering reconciliation and building a more
unified nation at the individual level was highly varied, and dependent on the individual
person who had to forgive, or ask for forgiveness for their actions. While this is an
essential and important understanding in order to comprehend the limits of the TRC and
the restorative model, it is also necessary to take a wider look at the views of South
African’s towards the TRC. In their article “Effectiveness of South Africa’s Truth and
Reconciliation Commission: Perceptions of Xhosa, Afrikaner, and English South
Africans,” Jay A. Vora and Erika Vora use survey data to evaluate how effective
everyday South Africans thought the TRC was at fulfilling its mission. In response to the
question “Is the TRC Effective in Bringing Out the Truth?,” “All participants perceived
the TRC to be effective in bringing out the truth, however, in varying degrees. The
Afrikaners perceived the TRC to be less effective in bringing out the truth than the
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English participants… and much less effective than did the Xhosa….”75 This indicates
that while South Africans overall believed the TRC achieved its mission of finding the
Truth, there were significant differences between different ethnic populations.
Even more importantly, in response to the question “Is the TRC effective in
Bringing About Reconciliation?” there was also a major discrepancy, this time, more
clearly split along racial lines. Overall, the Xhosa (who represented one of the African
groups interviewed) found the TRC far more effective at achieving its primary goal of
reconciliation than white South Africans regardless of whether they identified as
Afrikaners of English. The respondents also offered statements in support of their
position, with one Afrikaner saying “[The TRC] seems to be prolonging the
reconciliation process rather than actually contributing to it.”76 The effectiveness of
reconciliation, arguably the TRC’s most important goal, was viewed as a success by
many Africans, but as a failure by many Afrikaners, showing that there were widely
different views on the TRC between the black and white communities in South Africa.
These differences are important to understand because they touch the heart of the
TRC’s mission, the problem that different ethnic and racial groups the TRC was meant to
reconcile had divergent views on its effectiveness is an indication of a setback within the
TRC. Nevertheless, this survey evidence suggests that a large majority of South
Africans’ thought the TRC was effective at uncovering the truth about atrocities under
Apartheid, and a large portion of the population also believed the TRC to be at least
relatively effective at fostering some level of reconciliation. The individual examples
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from TRC testimony also indicate that to a tremendous degree, reconciliation was
dependent on individual people, and that both Africans and Afrikaners were able, and
were not able, to reconcile with victims and their relatives. The TRC, overall, met with
mixed results in its efforts to foster reconciliation, as there were amazing moments of
forgiveness and acceptance that occurred at the TRC, while at the same time, there were
many examples of people who found that they simply could not forgive those who had
done such terrible things to their relatives.

Conclusion

The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, was, like any justice
system imperfect, and suffered from a number of wide ranging difficulties that
challenged not only its effectiveness, but its legitimacy as well. These challenges
included criticism of the start and finish dates of the Commission, the influence of
domestic politics in South Africa, problems with calling witnesses, uncovering
documents, and moral and ethical attacks by victims, the media, and scholars in relation
to the contentious issue of amnesty. Despite these challenges, the TRC also had a
number of strengths as a system of justice that allowed and furthered reconciliation and
forward progress among South Africans. These strengths included the number of people
who were involved in the process, the cases in which the Commission was successful in
finding the truth for victim’s relatives, and most importantly, its tremendous focus on
victims overall.
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While there is significant debate about the merits and drawbacks of this system
among the academic and historical community, there is at least a minimal level of
consensus that the TRC was effective at its mission to uncover the truth about Apartheid
South Africa, and establish an accurate historical record. Unfortunately, the effectiveness
of the TRC’s mission of reconciliation remains uncertain at the present time, with
academics divided on whether the exercise was beneficial or not. There is evidence,
from survey data, interviews with individuals, as well as theoretical concepts and
academic writings that support the idea that the TRC was successful in reconciling these
various ethnic groups, as well as evidence to support the idea that the TRC let criminals
walk free without any benefit of reconciliation to South Africa. Ultimately, the intense
emotions that people carried with them about Apartheid helped to determine to what
extent people saw the TRC as a success.

COMPARING THE TWO MODELS
Introduction

Having spent the last two chapters establishing the different historical contexts
which the Nuremberg Tribunals and South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission
respectively took place, as well as the strengths and weaknesses evident in these cases
and systems, it is now time to examine the models comparatively, in order to gain insight
into which system provides a better way forward in post-conflict situations. Using the
strengths and weaknesses of each system, it becomes apparent that both models have
their strengths as well as their weaknesses, and that these strengths and weaknesses are in
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fact a direct result of the context that these justice systems grew out of, and the goals that
they were designed to meet.
This essay will argue that each system is uniquely adapted to addressing different
situations in which gross violations of human rights occur. However, it is essential to
recognize that these systems are not mutually exclusive, and that restorative justice is
often used with retributive justice. This essay will also examine the prospects, and
problems of combining these models. To conclude, this essay will look forward, to the
place of the retributive and restorative model in transitional justice in the future, and
suggest a number of key considerations that can be used to help determine which model
is best suited in what context.

A Comparison of Strengths and Weaknesses

The retributive Nuremberg model and the South African restorative model each
have unique strengths and weaknesses. By comparing these strengths and weaknesses, a
greater understanding of which system is more appropriate under certain circumstances.
For example, both models are to a large extent subject to the politics of the political
entities that they are created from. Evidence has shown that in South Africa, it was
impossible to remove the TRC from domestic politics, just as the Nuremberg Trials were
subject to the international politics between the Allied powers. Thus, one consideration
that arises from this realization when implementing systems of justice, is that careful
attention must be paid to understanding the various political atmospheres, in an attempt to
ensure that the judiciary is as independent as possible.
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In some cases, it is likely unfeasible for domestically set-up (meaning how
negotiations between opposed groups such as winner and loser, etc. are conducted) and
run institutions to achieve a fair atmosphere. At the same time the Cold War and the
international politics associated with it is routinely cited as a reason why Nuremberg
overwhelmingly failed to deliver on its legacy for the first half-century after 1946.77
Despite the best efforts to remove politics and establish and independent transitional
judiciary, it is a clear weakness of both systems that political governing bodies, on any
level, remain heavily involved in the justice process, and careful planning and
consideration must be made in an attempt to minimize this potentially clouding influence.
While the influence of politics is an issue that affects both systems, this essay will
argue that many of the weaknesses of each individual system can be alleviated, either
partially or completely, by using a combined system that endorses both retributive
Nuremberg style justice, as well as South African style restorative justice. At first, this
concept may seem foreign and impractical, however, it is important to remember, as was
noted previously, that both the Nuremberg Trials and the South African TRC contained
elements of restorative as well as retributive justice. However, in both cases the
emphasis was on one or the other, meaning that the Nuremberg Trials focused much
more on retributive justice, and much less on restorative justice, and vice versa in South
Africa. A system of justice that employs a more equal split has the potential to
significantly reduce the weaknesses of each individual system, and reinforce some of
their most important strengths.
For example, one of the strengths inherent in the Nuremberg model was its ability
to swiftly and effectively bring Nazi leadership and the perpetrators of the “Final
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Solution” to justice. However, one of the greatest drawbacks of this system, which
depends on individual criminal responsibility, was its inability to prosecute virtually
anyone involved with the Holocaust below the top tier. Thousands of people, who were
essential to the implementation of the “Final Solution” through guarding deportation
trains or concentration camps, never faced any repercussions for their part in the
atrocities. Meanwhile, the South Africa TRC brought thousands of people before it
through its amnesty application procedure, and many more to give testimony about their
actions, however failed repeatedly to reach or properly address those in the highest levels
of government in the Apartheid regime, those who were actually responsible for
implementing policy that resulted in the torture, false imprisonment, and death of so
many.
A more combined approach, incorporating both models on a more equal basis, has
the potential to alleviate these problems. A Nuremberg style Tribunal has the ability to
aggressively pursue those most responsible for the atrocities, and some form of a Truth
and Reconciliation Commission has the ability to pursue at least a basic level of
accountability for individuals below the top-tier of officials, who would otherwise have
to be almost completely ignored out of basic practical necessity, due to the rigors and
costs of establishing individual criminal responsibility. Thus, an examination of the
strengths and weaknesses of each system of justice lends itself to the idea that some of
the most important strengths of each system can be realized, while the individual
weaknesses of each system of can be minimized by such a blending of the retributive and
restorative models.
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Furthermore, there are many more ways in which the systems stand to become
more effective through combination that go well beyond merely involving people that
otherwise would not have been. Including reconciliation with retribution can lessen the
allegations and belief that the Trials were merely “Victor’s Justice” while still punishing
individuals. Likewise, the reverse criticism of the TRC, that it was too lenient and gave
perpetrators of heinous acts amnesty, can be diminished by the prosecution in the
retributive model of the most serious offenders. Additionally, the problems endemic in
the TRC with finding evidence and subpoenaing witnesses can be alleviated by a
powerful Nuremberg style court (international or otherwise) that can truly threaten those
that ignore its warrants and calls with prison sentences. These are just a few examples of
a long list of strengths that can be gained from combining the Nuremberg model of
retributive justice with the South African model of restorative justice. Overall, many of
the faults of each individual system can be, at the very least, marginalized by such a
combination, while using a combined model can emphasize the strengths of each system,
and potentially lead to a more meaningful system of justice for the victims, and when
necessary, for reconciliation.
A host of scholars have also come forward describing the importance, and
effectiveness of mixed Tribunals which invoke the practices of both Nuremberg and
South Africa. Madelaine Chiam in her article “Different Models of Tribunals” noted that
“Many of the judicial models adopted, whether international, mixed or national, have
been used in conjunction with other transitional justice mechanisms, most often truth
commissions.”78 There is no question that retributive mechanisms have been used with
their restorative counterparts in transitional justice settings. More importantly, Graham
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T. Blewitt, after arguing for “The Importance of a Retributive Approach to Justice” (the
title of his article) concluded, “I do not find the retributive approach to violations of
international humanitarian law incompatible with a restorative approach to justice but
rather complementary to it.”79 Blewitt’s conclusion is essentially that systems of justice
can actually be strengthened by the addition of restorative mechanisms to retributive
models, which he views as the necessary foundation of the justice system. While the idea
is relatively new, and admittedly somewhat counter-intuitive, there is evidence to suggest
that not only can truth commissions and tribunals work side-by-side, but that combining
them can actually improve the justice system, to better establish goals.
However, combining the models is not without its drawbacks. The most glaring,
and arguably most serious issue that immediately becomes apparent when discussing
combining the retributive and restorative system, is who qualifies for amnesty, and who
gets prosecuted and sent to prison. While it is probable that the leadership, those
responsible for formulating the policy, and advocating for the criminal acts can be
probable, what about lower level ranks of perpetrators? If those who have the least
responsibility for the atrocities are going to receive amnesty, or at least have the potential
to receive amnesty, there has to be a cutoff at some point. What defines where this cutoff
falls? Even more importantly, who defines where this cutoff falls in the hierarchy of
perpetrators? How do those designing the system ensure that whatever distribution is
decided upon is fairly implemented and non-discriminatory? These are all potentially
serious issues that arise from attempting to combine the Nuremberg and South African
models of justice. However, they are all issues that can be overcome with careful
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planning. Far more can be gained from a combined approach that incorporates retributive
and restorative justice than there are drawbacks to this newer model.

It Really Is All About the Victims…

Whichever system, or combination of systems is used, ultimately, the focus of any
justice system must be on the victims. The very essence of justice is to bring closure to,
or alleviate the suffering of those who have been victimized as the result of criminal acts.
Despite the serious flaws of the Nuremberg Tribunal in failing to accommodate victims
in its proceedings, this has been a drawback that future retributive models have corrected,
making sure to include the victims throughout the justice process. As a result, both
models have the capacity to maintain a necessary focus on victims. The danger, is that
both models also have the capacity to lose sight of this fundamental objective, and turn
their attention totally on the perpetrators, or even become caught up in their own quest for
successful prosecution.
To differing extents, the IMT and TRC were both systems that gave a voice to the
perpetrators of these heinous crimes. This is particularly true of Nuremberg, as the
necessities of criminal proceedings, and particularly the right of defendants to speak in
their defense, gave a large voice to Nazi perpetrators, and contributed to the low number
of victims speaking out. The TRC meanwhile, at least provided a more balanced
approach, giving a large voice to victims, while still allowing perpetrators to speak in
their defense. In this respect, the TRC may have an advantage over Nuremberg, as it
proved its attention can be largely on victims and serving them. At the same time
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however, it is important to recognize the evidence that there were thousands who did not
feel that justice was served by amnesty and truth, and in this regard, the TRC failed at
least those victims. Ultimately, both systems have the potential to serve the victims well,
but in order to do so must avoid the common problem of turning their attention instead
towards the perpetrators, and losing sight of victim’s rights.

How Different Contexts Lead To Different Goals And Procedures

The Nuremberg Trials and South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission
were direct byproducts of the nature of violations that they sought to redress. These
different systems were used based on key differences in the atrocities that led to their
implementation. The first key difference is that of scale. While no one would discount
the suffering of South Africans, the level of destruction did not reach anywhere near the
level that it had in Nazi Germany, where nearly 11 million were killed, and an entire
population of European Jews nearly wiped out.80 While murder dominated the trials in
both cases, in Nazi Germany, the murder was genocidal, the attempt by a state
government to eradicate entire groups of people (most notably the Jews).
This is an essential and important distinction. Genocide is, and must be regarded
as one of the, if not singly the most heinous crime that exists. World leaders, as well as
the public, demand a much more retributive form of justice to truly punish those
responsible, and possibly even dissuade future perpetrators. Thus the primary goal of
those calling for justice to be served was severe punishment based on the retributive
model. Those involved with the Nuremberg Charter, or who influenced it through their
80
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political status, had little interest in reconciliation or a more moderate approach to justice,
as can clearly be seen from the statements of men like Justice Robert Jackson, Winston
Churchill and Russian prosecutor Lieutenant-General Roman Andreyevich Rudenko.
Furthermore, there is a second key difference between South Africa and
Nuremberg in relation to the context of the violence. In Nuremberg, the violence was
overwhelmingly and unquestionably one-sided. In essence, this means that the Nazis
perpetrated terrible atrocities against Jewish populations throughout occupied Europe,
while the Jews did virtually nothing to them. Nowhere in the wealth of historical
documents and testimony is there any suggestion of Jews plotting or executing any plan
that might make them perpetrators of human rights violations themselves. Conversely, in
South Africa, the historical record is exactly the opposite. There is nearly irrefutable
evidence that the ANC, in its battle against the Apartheid South African government
engaged in actions that resulted in clear and malicious violations of innocent people’s
fundamental human rights. Immediately then, this context of two-sided violence,
meaning that both parties were responsible for violations presents a problem for the
retributive approach to justice without a war with a clear winner and loser.
Any attempt to use retributive justice against one party, at the very least brings
into question the actions of the other. For example, had the ANC upon entering office in
1994 decided to pursue Apartheid criminals in courts of law, it would immediately have
come into question itself for its role in combating Apartheid. If the ANC was going to
attempt to charge policemen with murder in a court of law, the immediate question would
be why ANC fighters and bombers, such as Robert McBride, were not being charged,
when from a legal standpoint, they had committed the exact same crime. In response to
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this, the ANC could have agreed to seek prosecution against its own fighters, and thus
admit their own wrongdoing (an option that is almost unfathomable given ANC
statements on how their actions were justified under a just war doctrine).
Another option would have been simply to ignore ANC violations and these
criticisms, and continue to seek justice only for those who had been apart of the
Apartheid regime. This would have had the effect of delegitimizing the criminal
proceedings, and even worse, would have made the ANC look in the eyes of South Africa
and the world, as though one illegitimate regime had been replaced by another.
Furthermore, any such action that ignored ANC responsibility would have driven an even
deeper rift between white and black South Africa. Clearly, the multifaceted nature of
violence in South Africa led to serious concerns and problems with any attempt by the
ANC government to use a retributive model. As a result, it is not surprising that the ANC
looked for an alternative system of justice to pursue accountability.
The context in which violations of fundamental human rights takes place has a
powerful impact on the type of justice system used to bring perpetrators to justice. While
there are a number of factors that affect the selection of a certain type or model or
transitional justice, two of the most important factors are the scale of violations, and
whether one party is clearly responsible, or if numerous parties can be prosecuted for
violations. It can be expected that in the future, violations that can be reasonably
described as genocide or are particularly egregious in scale, and in which one party is the
primary perpetrator of such crimes, a more retributive model of justice based on
punishment can be expected. Conversely, when violations do not reach the scale of
genocide, there is less international pressure for retributive justice, and if numerous
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parties can be accused of gross violations, a more restorative model of justice can be
expected.
Finally, some would argue that the goal of reconciliation or retribution are the
primary factors in determining what related model of justice will be used. While
intuitively this makes sense, this essay takes the position that the goals of reconciliation
and retribution are not independent, and in fact are closely associated with the nature and
context of the violations that took place. Nuremberg and South Africa are both examples
that the context in which the violations took place were primary motivators for whether
retributive or restorative justice was pursued, making the nature of the violations
themselves the motivators of the goals, which then directly help to determine the model
of justice. The grounding of this idea is well established by many of the comments made
in the setup of each system. Justice Jackson in his opening statement at Nuremberg left
little doubt that the sheer scale, deplorably heinous nature, and cold hearted ruthlessness
with which the Nazis pursued their Final Solution was a major factor in the establishment
of the Tribunal, and the pursuit of death penalties and lengthy prison sentences were the
response of the international community to these atrocities. Likewise in South Africa,
despite assertions by the ANC that they had acted responsibly under a just war doctrine,
the two-sided violence in which both the ANC’s armed wing and the Apartheid
government were responsible for the deaths of innocent people, the deceit, and the need
to foster a single South Africa, led directly to the ANC’s support of the TRC and
restorative justice, even when it called ANC leadership and activists before it to answer
for atrocities.
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A Difference In Legacy

While the context that the violence occurred in was among the most important
factors that contributed to the decision of which model of justice to use, it was not the
only factor. The decision of which system of justice to use was also influenced by the
outcomes that those who setup each judicial system desired. First, it is necessary to
demonstrate briefly that each judicial system does in fact result in a very different
outcome, in terms of how the guilty parties are viewed. In the long term, this issue
essentially deals with the legacy or each system.
The Nuremberg Legacy has been the complete denouncement of National
Socialist policies and practices, extending well beyond the Final Solution itself, and
resulting in continued aggressive pursuits of Nazi perpetrators. Perhaps nothing
illustrates the legacy and impact of Nuremberg on establishing Nazi guilt than
Archbishop Tutu’s experience in Israel. When asked after a visit to the Yad Vashem
Holocaust museum in Jerusalem for his impressions of the experience, Archbishop Tutu
asked “But what about forgiveness?” That remark set off a firestorm; Archbishop Tutu
“was roundly condemned” and “was charged with being anti-Semitic”.81 The simple
suggestion that perhaps the perpetrators of the Holocaust could be in some way forgiven
for their atrocities led to an immediate and powerful revolt against any such idea, and
Tutu faced the wrath of many, not just in Israel, for his suggestion. While this reaction
was not motivated completely by the legacy of Nuremberg, the Tribunal played no small
part in condemning those who were involved in perpetrating the Holocaust, and
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contributed greatly to a legacy that led Archbishop Tutu to face such sharp accusations
for so simple a statement.
In contrast, the legacy to emerge from South Africa has been less condemning
than Nuremberg, though it is also much more recent, and to be fair, the full legacy of the
TRC will likely not be known for several more decades. The atmosphere of the TRC,
underlain with so much Christian ideology of forgiveness and moving forward through
revealing the truth led to a much different legacy. While many of the policies of
Apartheid, most notably the racist underpinnings of the regime have met with near
universal condemnation, this was not a result of the TRC. One need only point to the
numerous declarations, economic sanctions, and boycotts of South African goods that far
predate the TRC to see evidence that condemnation came far before the TRC. In fact, the
TRC, with its open atmosphere and investigation into perpetrators of all races and groups,
led to a legacy that recognized the misguided acts of both the Apartheid government and
ANC activists. The ultimate legacy of the TRC then, is not merely the condemnation of
Apartheid, though it is undeniable that that system of government has been discredited,
but instead the realization by the international community that what took place in South
Africa was more than just the oppression of a group of people by a minority government.
The TRC, through its success in revealing the truth, literally rewrote many of the history
books concerning the battle against Apartheid, and has led to a legacy that recognizes the
horrors suffered by both white and black South Africa.
The difference in legacies between Nuremberg and South Africa are by no means
accidental. The legacy of Nuremberg has become largely what Justice Jackson and his
team sought, the complete condemnation of Nazism in all of its forms. Equally, the
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legacy of the TRC has fallen in line almost exactly with the goals that Nelson Mandela
and Archbishop Tutu laid out in 1994, the creation of a unified South Africa that was not
divided, as it had been for centuries, between white and black. Both systems succeeded
in producing the reaction among public opinion, governments, and historians that the
crafters desired. This is not necessarily a criticism of the systems, but merely a
recognition that the vastly different legacies to result from the IMT and TRC are clearly
not accidental, and that the type of system (retributive or restorative) used in each
situation played a major role in the formation of those legacies.

Conclusion

There has, not surprisingly, been much attention paid by historians, those who
study international systems of justice, and human rights scholars to the enormously
important Nuremberg Trials and South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
Less attention has been paid to the differences between these two systems, and the
strengths and weaknesses inherent in each. The point of this essay was first and
foremost, to point out that each system was to a very large extent the result of the
historical context it grew out of. As a result of this context, each system was designed to
meet very different goals, and context, in accordance with these goals was one of the
largest factors to help determine whether a more retributive or more restorative model of
justice was adopted. It is not surprising then that such a difference in the legacy of each
system, and of those who it prosecuted, can be found. The retributive Nuremberg based
model and restorative South African model are by no means mutually exclusive, and
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there is potentially much to be gained from combing these models. However, there are a
number of problems that result from attempting to combine the models, most importantly,
that each system had different, often conflicting goals that caused each system to be
implemented in the first place. Those implementing future systems of transitional justice
systems then, may have goals that lead them to largely favoring one system over another.
Finally, it may be helpful to examine some questions that contribute to the final decision
to use one system of justice over another….
•

Was one group responsible for the atrocities? Or were there multiple
groups who could all be legitimately charged with violating fundamental
human rights?

•

Did the violations occur on such a scale, or in such a deplorable manner,
as to necessitate more aggressive forms of punishment, to establish
precedent on behalf of the international community, and to dissuade
potential future perpetrators?

•

Do substantial needs for reconciliation exist? Do the groups’ involved
need to coexist peacefully? What are the prospects for future violence if
no reconciliation occurs, and one group merely blames the other for the
past atrocities?

•

Is it reasonable to expect that a national system of justice can be effective
at realizing its goals, and establishing some form of justice, or is that
beyond the means and realities of the country or countries affected, and
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does the international community need to in some way take charge? How
can as much separation between politics and the judiciary be ensured?82
•

What are the interests of the victims’? What will serve those interests the
best? What if victims have different interests and desired outcomes, and
perceive the idea of justice differently?

•

Is it possible to combine the models effectively, and still ensure justice,
what are the advantages, and disadvantages of attempting a retributive and
restorative system of justice?

•

If it becomes impossible to pursue a combination of retributive and
restorative justice, what is the most important desired outcome,
punishment, reconciliation, or something else?

These considerations are by no means meant to lead unequivocally to the
establishment of one system of justice over the other, but are merely some considerations
that should be, and indeed have been, taken into account as it becomes necessary to
establish new bodies of transitional justice to address a wide ranging set of different
situations with an equally large array of institutions and mechanisms which can be
individually applied to address each specific situation. Arguably the most appropriate
conclusion was made by Madelaine Chiam in her article entitled “Different Models of
Tribunals” in which she stated, “One lesson, perhaps the most important, is that there is

82

It is impossible to completely shield the judiciary from politics, but by removing it as far as
possible from dependence on other political organizations, and limiting oversight, a fair degree of
separation can be achieved.

Nuremberg or the South African TRC?

no ‘model’ approach to transitional justice.”83 Transitional justice systems need to be
case specific, and are dependent on a number of factors touched upon in this essay.
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